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How do citizens respond to the reallocation of authority across levels of government? 
This article investigates the relative importance 
of economic versus identity bases of citizen 
support for the most far-reaching example of 
authority migration—European integration.           
     Most scholars have explained preferences 
over European integration in terms of its 
economic consequences. We have precise 
expectations concerning how individual 
attributes (e.g., education, occupation, factor 
mobility, and sectoral location) affect support 
for international regimes. The search for 
plausible economic sources of preferences has 
widened to include economic perceptions (as 
well as objective conditions), group (as well 
as individual) utility, and national economic 
institutions that mediate individual interests. 
     But there is a new—or, rather, old—kid 
on the block. Its hard core is the assumption 
that citizen preferences are driven by group 
attachments, by the loyalties, values, and norms 
that defi ne who a person 
is. This line of analysis 
is as old as the study of 
European integration 
(Deutsch 1957; Haas 
1958; Inglehart 1970), but 
while the pioneers were 
chiefl y concerned with how 
regional integration affects 
identity, recent research 
fl ips the causal arrow.1      
     One would expect 
European integration to convey home fi eld 
advantage to both research programs. The 
European Union (EU) is a regional trade regime 
with sizeable distributional effects. It is also 
a system of multi-level governance in which 
national authority is pooled and limited. So we 
are conducting what Arend Lijphart describes as 
a crucial experiment, a case in which “all of the 
variables which the researcher tries to relate to 
each other are present” (1979, 444).2    
     There need be no suspense concerning 
our conclusion. Citizens do indeed take 
into account the economic consequences of 
European integration, but conceptions of group 
membership appear to be more powerful. 
     We proceed in two steps. First, we set up 
an economic explanation of public opinion 
on European integration. We identify six 
lines of theorizing. We cannot sacrifi ce 
comprehensiveness to parsimony because our 
analysis will be convincing only to the extent 
that we bring the main economic contenders into 
the ring—and there are many. 
     Second, we theorize identity as a source 
of public opinion on European integration. 
What would one expect if group identity drove 
preferences? The answer is not obvious. Citizens 
who attest strong national identity are more, not 
less, likely to identify with Europe. We argue 
that the way a citizen conceives her national 
identity is decisive. Does a citizen conceive her 
national identity in exclusive or inclusive terms? 
Is that citizen positively or negatively oriented 
to multiculturalism? 
Theorizing Support for European 
Integration
Political Economy 
The main thrust of European integration has 
been to sweep away barriers to economic 
exchange, facilitate mobility of capital and 
labor, and create a single European monetary 
authority. So it is not surprising that 
explanations of public opinion on European 
integration have focused on economic factors. 
     The simplest expectation is that reducing 
trade barriers favors citizens with relatively 
high income, education, and occupational 
skills (Gabel 1998; Inglehart 1970). There are 
several reasons for this. International economic 
openness rewards those with high levels of 
human capital. It increases the international 
substitutability of labor as fi rms are more able 
to shift production across borders, and this 
intensifi es job insecurity, particularly for less 
skilled workers. Finally, international economic 
openness puts pressure on welfare systems 
and shifts the burden of taxation from mobile 
factors of production (e.g., fi nancial capital) to 
immobile factors (e.g., labor).
     Economic internationalization also affects 
relative scarcity of assets. According to the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, trade benefi ts 
individuals who own factors with which the 
national economy is relatively well endowed 
and hurts individuals who own factors that are 
relatively scarce (Mayda and Rodrik 2002; 
O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001). Hence, in the 
wealthiest, most capital-rich member states 
we expect unskilled workers to be Euroskeptic 
and managers and professionals to be Euro-
supportive, while in the poorest, most labor-rich 
member states we expect the reverse.3
     Citizens may be sensitive to their collective 
economic circumstances, as well as to those 
that affect them individually (Anderson 1998). 
It seems reasonable to expect that residents in 
countries that are net recipients of European 
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Union spending will be inclined to support European integration, 
while those in donor countries will tend to oppose (Brinegar et 
al. 2004). The same logic is often at work in regional or federal 
states, where poorer regions champion centralization to increase 
the scope for redistribution while prosperous regions favor 
decentralization. 
     Subjective economic evaluations can be expected to infl uence 
public opinion on European integration alongside objective 
factors (Rohrschneider 2002; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). 
European integration is perceived by most citizens to shape their 
economic welfare in a general sense. Citizens who feel confi dent 
about the economic future—personally and for their country—are 
likely to regard European integration in a positive light, while 
those who are fearful will lean towards Euroskepticism. 
     Finally, preferences may be infl uenced by institutions. The 
European Union encompasses countries with contrasting degrees 
of labor and business coordination, each of which is costly to 
change (Hall and Soskice 2001). We assume that the further a 
country is from the EU median (low labor coordination, relatively 
high business coordination), the greater the costs imposed on its 
citizens by EU legislation.
     Political-economic institutions may interact with support or 
opposition to redistribution (Brinegar et al. 2004; Marks 2004; 
Ray 2004). If European integration converges on a mixed-market 
model, citizens in social democratic Scandinavian economies 
can expect to see their welfare systems diluted, while citizens 
in liberal market economies, such as Britain, can expect more 
redistribution. Hence in social democratic systems, the left will be 
opposed to European integration and the right will be supportive. 
In liberal market systems, the left will support integration and the 
right will be opposed. 
     Economic theories of preference formation work best when 
economic consequences are perceived with some accuracy, are 
large enough to matter, and when the choice a person makes 
actually affects the outcome. To the extent that these conditions 
are not present, group identities are likely to be decisive (Chong 
2002; Elster 1990; Sears and Funk 1991; Young et al. 1991). 
What would one expect to fi nd if public opinion were shaped by 
group identity? 
National Identity
     Humans and their ancestors evolved an emotional capacity 
for intense group loyalty long before the development of rational 
faculties, and such loyalties can be extremely powerful in shaping 
views toward political objects (Citrin et al. 1990; Massey 2002; 
Sears 1993). The strongest territorial identities are national, and 
we suspect that such identities constrain preferences on European 
integration.4 
     To understand the effect of national identity one must come 
to grips with a paradox. On the one hand, individuals often 
identify with several territorial communities simultaneously 
(Citrin and Sides forthcoming; Klandermans et al. 2003). It is 
not at all unusual for citizens to have multiple identities—to 
feel, for example, strongly Catalan, Spanish, and European—at 
one and the same time (Diez Medrano 2003; Marks 1999). 
Haesly (2001) fi nds positive, rather than negative, associations 
between Welsh and European identities and between Scottish 
and European identities. Klandermans and his co-authors (2003) 
detect a cumulative pattern of identities, in which farmers who 
identify with Europe tend also to identify with their nation. Risse 
(2003) conceptualizes the relationship as akin to a marble cake 
in which multiple identities are meshed together. Van Kersbergen 
(2000) conceives of European allegiance as embedded in national 
allegiance. Citrin and Sides fi nd that “even in an era in which 
perceptions of the European Union as successful seemed to 
decline, the tendency to identify with both nation and Europe 
increased” (forthcoming, 8; also Hermann, Brewer, and Risse 
forthcoming). 
     But it is also true that opposition to European integration 
is often couched as defense of the nation against control from 
Brussels. Radical right-wing political parties in France, Denmark, 
Italy, and Austria tap nationalism to reject further integration, 
and since 1996 such parties have formed the largest reservoir of 
Euroskepticism in the EU as a whole (Hooghe et al. 2002; Taggart 
1998). Christin and Trechsel (2002) fi nd that the stronger the 
national attachment and national pride of Swiss citizens, the less 
likely they are to support membership in the European Union. 
Carey (2002) shows that national attachment combined with 
national pride have a signifi cant negative effect on support for 
European integration.
     To resolve these confl icting expectations, we need to theorize 
how national identity can both reinforce and undermine support 
for European integration. Diez Medrano argues that national 
histories are crucial. Constructing patterns of discourse in the UK, 
Spain, and Germany, Medrano fi nds that English Euroskepticism 
is rooted in Britain’s special history of empire, that West German 
pro-Europeanism refl ects World War II guilt, and that the Spanish 
tend to support European integration as proxy for modernization 
and democratization (Diez Medrano 2003). A research team 
led by Stråth and Triandafyllidou links party programs, public 
opinion, educational curricula, and media within nine EU and 
prospective EU countries. Such studies reveal the stickiness of 
national identity within unique national contexts. 
     Can one generalize about the connection between national 
identity and public opinion? We begin with the basic distinction 
between exclusive and inclusive national identity, and we 
hypothesize that citizens who conceive of their national identity 
as exclusive of other territorial identities are likely to be 
considerably more Euroskeptical than those who conceive of 
their national identity in inclusive terms. We know, for example, 
Table 1
Explaining Support for European Integration -
A Multi-Level Analysis
Multilevel estimates
understandardized
coeffi cients
standard 
errors
Constant 
  National Attachment
  Exclusive National Identity
  Multiculturalism
71.96*** (2.185)
National Identity
   1.712***
-12.740***
   4.163***
(0.415)
(0.559)
(0.309)
  Education
  Professional/Manager*Gross  
    National Income
  Manual Worker*Gross National
    Income
  Fiscal Transfer
  Type of Capitalism
  Personal Economic Prospects
  National Economic Prospects
Political Economy
 0.932**
 0.072*
-0.033
 3.973***
 5.370**
 2.292***
 3.074***
(0.338)
(0.044)
(0.028)
(0.970)
(1.796)
(0.615)
(0.445)
  Country-Level
  Party-Level
  Individual-Level
Variance Components
   27.316**
     4.599**
 453.831***
(11.024)
  (1.838)
  (7.382)
-2 x Log Likelihood 68833
Note:  * = p<.10, ** = p <.01, *** = p<.001
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that individuals who identify themselves exclusively as Belgian 
or exclusively as Flemish oppose multi-level governance, while 
those who identify themselves as both Belgian and Flemish 
support it (Maddens et al. 1996). We expect to fi nd something 
similar at the supranational level.
     Under what circumstances will citizens perceive their 
national identity as exclusive or inclusive? While national 
identities are normally formed before adolescence (Druckman 
1994), we hypothesize that their consequences for particular 
political objects, such as European integration, are continuously 
constructed through socialization and political confl ict (Stråth 
and Triandafyllidou 2003; Diez Medrano 2003). But who does 
the framing? Literature on American public opinion suggests 
that public opinion may be cued by political elites (Zaller 1992, 
97–117). The sharper the divisions among national elites on the 
issue of European integration, the greater the scope for national 
identity to be mobilized, and the more we expect exclusive 
national identity to bite. One sign of such division is the existence 
of a radical right political party. Parties like the Vlaams Blok 
in Belgium and the French Front National make a fetish of 
exclusive national identity with slogans such as “Boss in Our 
Own Country” and “We give them our factories; they give us their 
immigrants. One solution: The Nation.” Such sentiments reinforce 
Euroskepticism.5 In countries where the elite is squarely behind 
the European project, we expect national identity to lay dormant 
or to be positively associated with support for integration. In 
countries where the political elite is divided on the issue, national 
identity is likely to rear its head. 
Analysis
To measure support for European integration we combine three 
complementary elements of support: the principle of membership, 
the desired speed of integration, and the desired direction of 
future integration. The results reported below are robust across 
these component measures. This and other variables in our 
analysis are detailed in the appendix.6 We use multilevel analysis 
to probe variation at the individual, party, and country level.7 
Table 1 presents unstandardized coeffi cients and standard errors 
for variables of interest.8 
     Figure 1 illustrates the relative effect of the most powerful 
variables. The solid boxes encompass the inter-quartile range 
and the whiskers indicate the 5th to the 95th percentiles, holding 
all other independent and control variables at their means. For 
example, an individual at the 5th percentile on Multiculturalism 
has a score of 65.9 on Support for European Integration on a 
0–100 scale, and an individual at the 95th percentile scores 74.3. 
The variables towards the left of Figure 1 have the largest effect 
across their inter-quartile range.
    Citizens do appear to take economic circumstances into 
account. The EU redistributes money from rich to poor countries, 
and this gives rise to a predictable pattern of opposition and 
support. Fiscal Transfer is the most powerful economic infl uence 
that we fi nd. A citizen of Greece, the country with the highest 
per capita net receipts from the EU, will be 15% more supportive 
of European integration than a citizen from Germany, the 
country with the highest net contribution, controlling for all 
other variables in our analysis. The differing length of the 95% 
whiskers in Figure 1 for this variable indicates that its association 
with support for European integration is not linear. Fiscal 
Transfer sharply delineates four countries (Greece, Portugal, 
Spain, and Ireland) that receive the bulk of cohesion funding and 
which tend to be pro-EU. 
     We also confi rm the effect of Type of Capitalism. Support 
for European integration is higher in countries whose economic 
institutions are less likely to be challenged by EU legislation 
because they are close to the EU median.9 
     Together, seven variables that tap individual and group 
economic interest (listed in the appendix) account for 15% of total 
variance in public opinion, which is in line with previous studies. 
The surprise is that these economic infl uences are overshadowed 
by identity. 
     Three variables that tap identity—Exclusive National Identity, 
Multiculturalism, and National Attachment—together explain 
20.8 % of the variance in Support for European Integration. 
These variables also account for more than two-thirds of the 
variance across countries. 
     The paradox that we identifi ed earlier is apparent: national 
identity both contributes to and diminishes support for European 
integration. Attachment to one’s country is positively correlated 
with Support for European Integration in bivariate analysis.10 
But national identity is Janus-faced: under some circumstances it 
collides with European integration. 
     The extent to which national identity is exclusive or inclusive 
is decisive. A Eurobarometer question compels respondents to 
place either European or national identity above the other, and 
separates those who say they think of themselves as “only British 
(or French, etc.)” from those who say they have some form of 
multiple identity. Estimates for Exclusive National Identity are 
negative, substantively large, and signifi cant in the presence 
of any and all controls we are able to exert.11
     On average, an individual in our sample who claims an 
exclusive national identity scores 53.3 on our thermometer 
scale for support for European integration, compared to 
72.8 for a person who does not. The difference, 19.5%, is 
the baseline in Figure 2.12 In some countries, citizens who 
have exclusive national identity are only slightly more 
Euroskeptical than those with multiple identities. In others, 
exclusive national identity is powerfully associated with 
Euroskepticism. In Portugal, exclusive national identity 
depresses a citizen’s support by just 9.5%. In the UK, at the 
other extreme, the difference is 29.5%.
     How can one explain this variation? Our hunch, derived 
from what we know about American public opinion, seems 
to be on the right track. The more divided a country’s elite, 
and the more elements within it mobilize against European 
integration, the stronger the causal power of exclusive 
national identity. Political parties are decisive in cueing the 
public, and the wider their disagreement, the more exclusive 
identity is mobilized against European integration. 
Divisions within political parties are positively correlated 
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with the causal power of exclusive national 
identity, as is the electoral strength of radical 
right parties. These two variables account for an 
estimated 57% of the country variance illustrated 
in Figure 2. 
     We have argued that there is no necessary 
connection between national identity and support 
or opposition to European integration. The 
dots have to be fi lled in, and we fi nd that the 
connection is stronger when elites, particularly 
those leading political parties, are polarized on the 
issue.13 
Conclusion
     It is fruitless to seek general validity in either 
economic or identity theories of preferences. We 
need to inquire into their relative causal power. In 
this article, we do this for a single object: public 
opinion on European integration. Most scholars 
have conceptualized European integration as an 
economic phenomenon, and the bulk of research 
has therefore theorized public opinion as a 
function of the distributional consequences of 
market liberalization. But the European Union 
is also a supranational polity with extensive 
authority over those living in its territory. It is 
therefore plausible to believe that European 
integration engages group, and above all, national 
identities.
     Both theories bite. A multi-level model that 
combines both sources of preference can explain 
around a third or more of the variance across 
individual citizens in the EU, and the bulk of 
variation across countries. However, we fi nd 
that identity appears to be the more powerful 
infl uence. To understand how the public views 
European integration, one needs to consider 
how individuals frame their national identity. Do 
citizens consider national identity as something 
that can go hand in hand with European 
integration, or do they believe that European integration limits or 
threatens their national identity? There is nothing mechanistic or 
inevitable about one or the other position. 
     Identity is simple and complex. Citizens can answer the 
question “What is your nationality” with much greater ease and 
validity than they can tell you for which party or candidate they 
voted in the previous election. Like some in-group/out-group 
identities, national identities are formed early in life. Children as 
young as six know full well whether they are British, German, or 
Swedish. Yet the political implications of national identity emerge 
from debate and confl ict. Whether a person is Belgian or British 
is (usually) a simple fact, but what does this national identity 
imply for the political choices one makes? 
     To understand the political implications of identity one 
therefore has to probe how identity is constructed and mobilized. 
Political elites and parties appear to be key. Exclusive national 
identity is mobilized against European integration in countries 
where the elite is polarized on European integration, where 
political parties are divided, and where radical right parties are 
strong. Data over time would help scholars probe further. 
     In terms of deductive sophistication, identity theory cannot 
compete with economic theory—yet. But this is like comparing a 
gasoline engine, honed over decades, with a hydrogen engine. If 
group identities are decisive for preferences over a wide range of 
political objects, as recent research suggests, then we can safely 
predict that the theories of group identity will become more 
sophisticated and more powerful.
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     1. Research on public opinion on trade liberalization has 
come up with an interesting and unexplained fact. Citizens 
who attest high levels of national attachment tend to oppose 
trade liberalization both in the United States and across 
OECD countries. National attachment appears to be a more 
powerful infl uence than conventional economic factors, 
a fi nding that is all the more “disturbing” because it has 
emerged in two independent tests of economic, not identity, 
theories (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Mayda and Rodrik 
2002). 
     2. An additional virtue is that data on public support for 
European integration are more comprehensive than for any 
other international body.
     3. Eurobarometer data do not allow us to test a 
Heckscher-Ohlin model, which hypothesizes that support 
for economic internationalization varies across export-
competing and import-competing sectors. However, analysis 
of public opinion on trade protectionism suggests that the 
substantive effect of sectoral location is small (Mayda and 
Rodrik 2002).
     4. Recent work emphasizes how a clash of identities on 
issues such as immigration, multiculturalism, and European 
integration structures politics (Kriesi and Lachat 2004).
     5. Our hypothesis would be tautological if elites follow 
citizens, or if citizens vote for radical right parties because 
they are Euroskeptic. Neither concern has empirical validity. 
     6. Data are from Eurobarometer 54.1 (fi eldwork in 
the fall of 2000). The dataset was made available by the 
Mannheim Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen 
(ZUMA). 
     7. Multi-level analysis is preferable to standard OLS 
regression when cases are clustered in groups (Steenbergen 
and Jones 2002). Our full multilevel model explains about 
38% of the total variance among 7,641 respondents across 
the EU minus Luxembourg (http://www.unc.edu/~hooghe). 
We weight countries equally in all results reported here.
     8. We control for gender, age, occupation, opinion 
leadership, knowledge of European politics, partisanship, 
left-right self-identifi cation, and attachment to Europe (see 
www.unc.edu/~hooghe for details). 
     9. Some observers argue that there is convergence on 
liberal market capitalism. This hypothesis fares worse in our 
empirical test than the one specifi ed here.
     10. The association between National Attachment and 
Support for European Integration is usually insignifi cant 
under controls, and becomes negative when we control for 
European Attachment.
     11. To ensure that our measure of Exclusive National 
Identity does not tap absence of European identity, 
we control for European Attachment. This imposes 
conservatism in estimating the effect of our identity 
variables.
     12. The bars in Figure 2 are empirical Bayes estimates 
derived from a random coeffi cients multi-level model using 
Appendix: Variable Descriptions
An index of three items: (1) Principle of membership – “Generally 
speaking, do you think that [our country’s] membership of the 
European Union is (a bad thing, neither good nor bad, a good 
thing)?” (2) Desired speed – (1=integration should be brought 
to a “standstill”; 7= integration should run “as fast as possible”), 
and (3) Desired direction – “In fi ve years’ time, would you like 
the European Union to play (a less important role, same role, a 
more important role) in your daily life?” The correlation is 0.409 
between (1) and (2), 0.448 between (1) and (3), and 0.473 
between (2) and (3). Standardized item  = 0.706. The index 
is recoded as a 0-100 thermometer scale, with higher scores 
indicating greater support. 
Support for 
European 
Integration
Measured by the age of respondents when they stopped full-time 
education (D.8) and recoded on a 4-point scale. 
Education
Interaction term of (1) a dichotomous variable Professional Man-
ager that takes a value of 1 when respondent is professional (self-
employed or employed), general manager, or business proprietor 
(D.15), and (2) gross national income per capita for respondent’s 
country of residence (in US dollars at exchange rate prices for 
2001, divided by 1000). Values range from zero to 30.6 for 
Denmark. Source: World Development Indicators Database 
(Worldbank, April 2003.) 
Professional/
Manager*
Gross National
Income
Interaction term of (1) a dichotomous variable Manual Worker 
that takes a value of 1 when respondent is skilled or unskilled 
manual worker, or non-desk employee (e.g., salesman, driver) 
(D.15), and (2) gross national income per capita for respondent’s 
country of residence (in US dollars at exchange rate prices for 
2001). Values range from 0 to 30.6 for Denmark. Source: World 
Development Indicators Database (Worldbank, April 2003.)
Manual Worker*
Gross National
Income
An index of three items measuring respondents’ expectations 
(worse, same, better) concerning their future life, the fi nancial situ-
ation in their household, and their job situation (Q.501, Q503, 
Q505). Standardized item  = 0.763. Values range from 1 to 3.
Personal
Economic 
Prospects
National
Economic
Perspectives
An index of two items measuring respondents’ expectations 
(worse, same, better) concerning the economic situation and the 
employment situation in their country (Q.502, Q504.) Values 
range from 1 to 3.
Fiscal
Transfer
Categorization based on type of national production system 
(liberal market vs. mixed vs. coordinated) and extent of welfare 
redistribution (limited, medium, extensive—measured by Gini 
index). Country scores refl ect distance from the median (mixed 
system, medium redistribution) whereby the median category is 
2, adjacent cells are 1, and two cells removed are 0. Source: 
Gourevitch and Hawes (2001.)
Type of 
Capitalism
National
Attachment
A dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 for respondents 
with exclusive national identity ([nationality] only). Recoded from: 
“In the near future, do you see yourself as (1) [nationality] only, 
(2) [nationality] and European, (3) European and [nationality], or 
(4) European only?” (Q.23.)
Exclusive
National
Identity
“Thinking about the enlargement of the European Union to 
include new countries, do you tend to agree or tend to disagree 
with the following statement …’With more member countries, 
Europe will be culturally richer’ (tend to disagree, don’t know, 
tend to agree).’” (Q.399.) This is a 3-point scale.
Multiculturalism
Net fi scal transfers per country as percentage of GDP as an an-
nual average over the period of 1995-2000. Values range from 
-0.56 for Germany to 3.88 for Greece. Source: Commission of 
the European Union (2001.)
Question Q. 803: “People may feel different degrees of attach-
ment to their town or village, to their region, to their country, or 
to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to … (3) [our 
country]: very attached, fairly attached, not very attached, not at 
all attached, don’t know.” This is a 4-point scale.
Note: Q and D notations refer to questions in the Eurobarometer codebook (Hartung 
2002).
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     13. See http:\\www.unc.edu/~marks for details. Data on party divisions 
and the radical-right vote are from an expert survey conducted by Marks and 
Steenbergen in 1999. Our data do not allow us to evaluate the direction of 
infl uence between voters and political parties. Here we make the contestable 
claim that parties cue the implications of exclusive national identity for 
citizens (Carrubba 2001).
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